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Abstract
The paper uses two handͲcollected datasets to implement a novel
research design for analyzing the precursors to patent quality.
Operationalizing patent “quality” as legal validity, the paper analyzes the
relationbetweenFederalCircuitdecisionsonpatentvalidityandthreesets
of data about the patents:  quantitative features of the patents
themselves,textualanalysisofthepatentdocuments,anddatacollected
fromtheprosecutionhistoriesofthepatents.Thepaperfindslargeand
statisticallysignificantrelationsbetweenexpostvalidityandbothtextual
features of the patents and ex ante aspects of the prosecution history
(especiallypriorartsubmissionsandtheexistenceofinternalpatentoffice
appeals before issuance).  The results demonstrate the importance of
refocusing analysis of patent quality on replicable indicators like validity,
andthevaluethatmorecomprehensivecollectionofprosecutionhistory
datacanhaveforimprovingtheoutputofthepatentprosecutionprocess.
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Introduction

What can justify another paper about patent quality?  No respected observer doubts
thatthesystemisbrokenorthatthecentralproblemisadeclineinthequalityofpatents(Jaffe
and Lerner 2004; National Research Council 2004; Bessen and Meurer 2008).  Most would
agreethatthesystemhasfailedrecently;theconventionalviewisthatCongressovershotthe
markwhenitgavetheFederalCircuitamandatetoeasethestandardappliedtoassesspatent
validity(JaffeandLerner2004).Nobodybelievestheproblemsaretrivialoracademic;itisa
giventhatthefailureofthepatentsystemcausesanimportantdragonthecompetitivenessof
the national economy (Bessen and Meurer 2008; Burk and Lemley 2009).  The consensus of
systemfailurehaslegislatorspoisedtomakesubstantialchangesinthepatentsystemtolimit
thecoststhatbadpatentsimposeoninnovators(H.R.1260andS.515,111thCong.,1stSess.),
the PTO moving aggressively to take a larger role in the system (Long 2009), and leading
academics proposing a lengthy menu of systemic changes (Benjamin and Rai 2007; Lichtman
andLemley2007;NardandDuffy2007).
Yetthereisastarkmismatchbetweentheburgeoningacademicliteratureaboutpatent
quality and the legal issues motivating calls for system reform.  Thus, a methodologically
intricateeconometricsliteraturehasuseddataaboutreferencesinandtopatentstomeasure
theextenttowhichpatentsreflectimportantinnovationsordisseminateinformationtofuture
researchers (Jaffe & Trajtenberg 2002; OwenͲSmith & Powell 2003; Thompson and FoxͲKean
2005; Singh 2005; Alcácer and Chung 2007).  Other scholars have developed multiͲvariable
indicators that attempt to measure patent value, generally building on the intuition that
litigated patents are likely to be more valuable than nonlitigated patents (Allison et al. 2004;
Lanjouw&Schankerman2004;Allison&Mann2007).Buttheexistingscholarshipcontributes
littletodebatesaboutsystemreform,becauseitrestsonconceptionsofqualitythatsaylittle
ornothingaboutthestrengthsandweaknessesofthepatentingprocess:thePTOhasneither
controlnorresponsibilityforthefrequencywithwhichissuedpatentsarecitedorinvolvedin
litigation.
Thispapertakesadifferentapproachtoquality.Insteadofexaminingtheinformation
content or economic value of patents, we investigate legal validity as a metric of quality.  To
operationalizethatmetric,wecollectallpatentsforwhichtheFederalCircuithasconsidered
validity since 2003.  To build a robust understanding of the features that might relate to
validity,wedonotlimitouranalysistothefeaturesapparentonthefaceofthepatents(the
focus of the existing literature).  Rather, we also use the textual features of the patent (how
well the specification and claims are aligned) and detailed information from the prosecution
histories.
Theresearchdesignallowsustoanalyzetheempiricalrelationbetweenthetwopartsof
the patent system: the interaction between the work of the applicant and examiner and the
2|P a g e 

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671784

reliability of the patent that issues. If the heart of the policy concern about patents is a
suspicion that the applicant’s work in preparing applications or the PTO’s work in examining
themisnotsufficientlyrigorous,thedatapresentedherespeaktotheissuemuchmoredirectly
thananalysesofeconomicvalueorinventivenessthathavecharacterizedpriorworkonpatent
quality.
Section2ofthepaperdiscussesourconceptionofpatentqualityanditsprecursorsin
theprosecutionprocess.Section3discussesthedata.Section4presentstheresults.Section5
discussestheimplicationoftheresultsforpatentreform.Section6brieflyconcludes.

2

PatentQualityandItsPrecursors

Thefirststepinthestudyofpatent“quality”istosettleonanunderstandingofpatent
qualitythatcanbeoperationalizedandempiricallytested.Becausetheterm“quality”isitself
sogeneral,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatdifferentgroupsofscholarshaveusedthetermto
examinedistinctconceptsrelevanttotheirowninterests.
Themostadvancedliteratureaboutpatentquality,characterizedbytheseminalworkof
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, has analyzed the extent to which patents reflect and
facilitate the diffusion of knowledge, as evidenced by citations to and in patents.  Important
topics in that literature have included differences between patents issued to university and
commercial researchers (Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1998), the relative importance of
geographicalandnetworkties(Jaffe,Trajtenberg,andHenderson1993;JaffeandTrajtenberg
2002; Thompson and FoxͲKean 2005; Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005; Singh 2005;
Thompson2006;Singhetal.2010;SorensonandSingh2010),andtherelativeimportanceof
lone inventors as compared to teams of inventors (Wuchty et al. 2007; Singh and Fleming
2010).
Thebasicpremiseofthatliteratureresonateswiththefundamentalroleofthepatent
system in driving the development and disclosure of new technology.  Hence, if the primary
purposeofthepatentsystemistoforcethepublicdisclosureofnewtechnology,thenpatent
quality is a function of the importance of the technology disclosed in issued patents and the
extenttowhichthedisclosurefacilitatesuseofthetechnologybysubsequentresearchers.At
the same time, many aspects of legal validity1 are largely irrelevant to this perspective.  For
example,theexistenceofoverbroadclaimsdoesnothingtounderminethequalityofapatent
thatdisclosesanimportanttechnology.
Asecondliterature,whichbridgesfinanceandlegalscholarship,hasanalyzedqualityin
thesenseofeconomicvalue.Thepremiseofthisliteratureisthatthepatentsystemisdoinga
betterjobifthepatentsareworthmoreandaworsejobiftheyareworthless.Relatedtothat
point, increases and decreases in the value of patents have important implications for

1

 Technically, Federal Circuit decisions do not hold a patent valid or invalid, they hold
onlythatthechallengedportionsofthepatentareinvalidornotinvalid.Forconvenience,we
referlooselytosuchpatentsasvalidandinvalid.Wediscussindetailbelowtheimplicationsof
thisforstatisticalanalysisofthosedecisions.
3|P a g e 

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671784

corporate finance and investment (Rivette and Kline 1999).  The fundamental difficulty that
literaturehasfacedhasbeentheproblemofvaluingpatents.Itisdifficulttoobservepatent
valuedirectly,becausesalesofpatentsonanopenmarketarequiteuncommon,andbecause
the terms of licensing transactions normally are proprietary and often involve nonͲmonetary
considerations(likecrossͲlicensing).
Hence,scholarsinthatliteraturehaveusedvariousproxiesforvalue.Forexample,the
most prominent papers from legal academics examine the differences between litigated
patentsandunlitigatedpatents(Allisonetal.2004)orbetweenpatentsforwhichmaintenance
feesarepaidandthoseforwhichmaintenancefeesarenotpaid(Moore2005;Bessen2008).
Others,buildingonthatwork,haveattemptedtoidentifyparticulartypesofpatentsthathave
the characteristics of value identified in the studies of litigated and maintained patents
(LanjouwandSchankerman2004;AllisonandMann2007).Financescholars,studyingpatents
heldbypubliclytradedfirms,haveexaminedtherelationbetweenpatentportfoliosandfirm
value(HallandMcGarvie2006).Stillothers(exclusivelyintheE.U.)havesurveyedpatenteesor
theirattorneys(Sapsalisetal.2006;Harhoffetal.2003;Reitzig2004).
Likethediffusionmetric,thevaluemetricisonlylooselyrelatedtovalidity.Thus,the
economicvalueofthepatentwilldependbothonthelikelihoodthatthepatentisvalidandon
thevalueofthemarketinwhichthepatentisdeployed.Forexample,apoorlydraftedpatent
ofdubiousvaliditymightbeworthtens(orhundreds)ofmillionsofdollarsifitpurportstoclaim
rights to a valuable product (like the Blackberry or Microsoft Word).  Conversely, a patent
drafted with sterling clarity and undoubted novelty might be worth little or nothing if the
product that it describes is unmarketable.  This is important because an emphasis on that
metricwouldsuggestnobasisforconcernifweweresubsequentlytolearnthatthepatentsat
issue in the Blackberry and Word cases – each of which was worth tens if not hundreds of
millions of dollars when issued – were invalid.  Because most policy analysts focus their
attentionontheissuanceofpatentsthatarelegallydubious,afocusoneconomicvalueseems
atbestincomplete.
Attempting to avoid the limitations of the diffusion and value metrics, this paper
conceives of quality as legal validity.  A focus on legal validity has several advantages for
present purposes.  First, many of the problems attributed to the patent system relate to
patents of dubious validity.  Second, although legal validity is itself difficult to predict and
subject to change over time, it is still more objective than an inquiry into the importance or
innovativeflairoftheinvention.Asdiscussedabove,thoseinquiriesarelikelytodissolveinto
an investigation into loose proxies for the monetary value of the patent or some postͲhoc
considerationofitssocietalimpact.Althoughitisimportantforbusinessestounderstandthe
value of their patents, monetary value is of relatively little use in a project focused on
improving the patent system.  Similarly, although incenting invention and diffusion of
knowledgeiscentraltothesuccessofthepatentsystem,thefocusofpresentconcernsison
the dubious and uncertain validity of issued patents.  For empirical analysis to inform those
concernsitmustanalyzethemdirectly.Insum,toimprovetheprocessthroughwhichpatents
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are issued, it is important to understand the relation between characteristics of that process
andthevalidityofthepatentsitproduces.2
Havingsettledonvalidityastherelevantaspectofquality,thenextstepistoconsider
what features of the application and prosecution process might relate to better or worse
quality.Weanalyzethevalidityofthepatentasafunctionofthreedistinctsetsofinputs:the
invention,effortbytheapplicant,andeffortbytheexaminer.Thenatureoftheinventionis
important to the validity of the patent because the “inventiveness” that may (or may not)
distinguish the invention from prior art is a central component of patent validity.  A patent
based on an invention that lacks inventiveness will have poor quality because it lacks the
requisitenoveltyandnonobviousnessrequiredforlegalvalidity;conversely,apatentbasedon
aninventionwithinventivenessatleasthasthechanceofissuingwithhighquality.Tobesure,
aninventionthatmakesonlyasmalladvanceoverpriorartstillcouldproduceapatentofhigh
qualityifthedistinctionfrompriorartisnotobviousandiscarefullyspecifiedanddelineated.
Butthepointisthatlegalvaliditydependsonaninherentfeatureoftheinvention–notwithin
the control of the applicant or the examiner – a sort of “technological truth” about the
differencebetweentheinventionandthepriorart.

PrecursorsofPatentQuality



Invention
(Inventiveness)

ApplicantInput
(A’sDrafting,
A’sSearch)

 Prosecution
(E’sDrafting,
 E’sSearch,
 A’sEffort,PTO)



Patent
“Quality”

Thesecondstepoftheprocessistheapplication.Wedistinguishtwodistinctconcepts
thatinformthequalityoftheapplication:thedraftingeffortoftheapplicant,andthesearch
effort of the applicant.  Thus, the quality of the application depends on the effort that the
applicant puts into accurately specifying the nature of the invention and defining the claims
thatwillsetthepatentapartfrompriorart.Thequalityoftheapplicationalsodependsonthe
extenttowhichtheapplicantsearchesforpriorart,becausetheapplicant’sknowledgeofprior
art will affect the accuracy and effectiveness of the applicant’s discussion of the patent’s
inventiveness.Anapplicantthatdoesnotfullyunderstandthepriorartrelatedtothepatent
cannotproduceanapplicationofthesamequalityasonethatdoes.
The third and most important step of the process is the prosecution process.  We
distinguish four distinct concepts that inform the quality of the prosecution process.  The
examiner’s effort in criticizing the way in which the patent is drafted is important because it
enhances the likelihood that the final patent will be well crafted, so that (for example) the
claims will be definite in light of the specification.  The examiner’s search effort affects the
likelihood that the claims accurately distinguish the disclosed invention from prior art.  The

2

Theconceptionsofqualitywediscusshererelatetothepublicbenefitsofthepatent
system.Thus,wearenotconsideringthe“quality”ofthepatentinthesenseofthelikelihood
thatitsecuresfortheapplicantthebroadestpossiblemonopolyoverthedisclosedinvention.
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applicant’s effort in providing information about the invention and in responding to the
examiner’sinputisalsoimportanttothequalityofthefinalproduct.Forexample,evenifthe
applicant understands the prior art, the quality of the process is undermined if the applicant
fails to disclose the prior art to the examiner.  There is significant potential for cooperation;
because both parties are searching for the same prior art, a better search effort by the
applicantlowersthenecessarysearcheffortfortheexaminer,andviceversa.Similarly,thereis
agreatdealofroomformore(andless)cooperativeeffortsbytheapplicant,amendingclaims
readily or grudgingly in response to newly discovered prior art. Finally, where applicable, the
reviewprocessofthePTOBoardprovidesanopportunitytooverseetheworkoftheexaminers
andthustoimprovethefinalqualityoftheoffice’soutput.
Severalthingsaboutthisdiscussionwarrantemphasis.First,theconceptionisdynamic:
the quality of the issued patent is likely to differ from the quality of the application initially
filed, and the extent of this difference will depend on what happens during the prosecution
process.Second,quality(validity)dependsonthejointeffortthattheexaminerandapplicant
bringtotheprocess:thebetterthateffort,themoretheprocesswillimprovetheapplication
beforeissuingtheresultingpatent,andthegreaterthelikelihoodthattheresultingpatentwill
bevalid.Neitherpartystandingalonecanensurethattheoutcomeoftheprocessisapatent
of high quality and the successful fulfillment of the responsibilities of each party depends on
input from the other.  To put it another way, because each party has unique and important
capabilities, a system that does not motivate both parties to work toward the production of
qualitypatentscannotbeexpectedtosucceed.

3

DataCollection

Asthediscussionabovesuggests,theresearchdesignrelatesquantitativeinformation
about the patents and the process that led to their issuance to the ultimate validity of the
patents.Thisrequiresusfirsttodefinethepopulationofvalidandinvalidpatents,andthento
collectdataaboutthosepatentsthatrelatetotheconcepts.Specifically,aswediscussindetail
inthesucceedingsections,thedatasetincludesthreetypesofinformationaboutthepatentsin
thepopulation.First,followingpriorresearchers(Allisonetal.2004;Moore2005;Lanjouw&
Schankerman2004),wecollectedasmuchautomatedinformationaboutquantitativefeatures
evidentonthefaceofthepatents(claims,references,classes,andthelike)aswaspracticable.
Second,usingcontentanalysis,weestimatedthedegreeofalignmentbetweentheclaimsand
specificationofeachofthepatents.Third,wehandͲcollecteddetailedinformationaboutthe
prosecutionhistoriesofeachofthepatents.Ingeneral,theideawastoestimatethefollowing
equation:

ሺܸ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ  ݈ି ݐ݅݃ଵ ሺߙ  ߚܺ  ߛܻ  ߜܼ  ߝሻ
WhereVisthevalidityofthepatenti,Xisavectorofvariablesfromtheprosecutionhistory,Y
is the alignment of the claims and the specification in the issued patent, and Z is a vector of
variables from the face of the patent, standardized by matching where practicable.  The
overridinghypothesisisthattheprosecutionhistoryandalignmentdatawillrelatetovalidityin
importantways.
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3.1 FederalCircuitDecisions
For validity, the most direct measure is the results of litigation,3 and in particular a
decisionoftheFederalCircuit,availableonlyforthesmallsubsetofpatentsthatarethesubject
oflitigationbeforethatcourt.ExceptintherarecaseofSupremeCourtreview,FederalCircuit
decisionsonvaliditydefinitivelyestablishthatclaimsofthepatentinquestionare(orarenot)
invalid.Eventhere,theSupremeCourthasneverreversedaFederalCircuitdecisionholdinga
patentinvalid.Tobegin,then,wecollectedFederalCircuitdecisionsthatdefinitivelyresolvea
claimaboutthevalidityofanissuedpatent.4WorkingfromtheUnitedStatesPatentQuarterly,
supplemented by LEXIS searches for unreported decisions, we include all cases decided from
January1,2003throughDecember31,2009,foratotaldatasetof266casesadjudicatingthe
validity of 366 patents.  The balance between validity and invalidity was relatively even: the
court held 147 of the 366 patents (40.2%) valid.5  We collected several variables about the
Federal Circuit’s disposition of the case.  For example, to judge the clarity of the patent’s
validityorinvalidity,wecollectedinformationaboutwhethertherewasadissent,whetherthe
decisionwaspublishedorunpublished,andwhethertheFederalCircuitaffirmedthedecision
ofthetrialcourt.Wealsocategorizedallofthedecisionsintothreebroadcategoriesbasedon
the legal issues that the court addressed: prior art (usually anticipation or obviousness),
drafting(usuallydefinitenessorenablement,butoccasionallydoubleͲpatentingorrecapture),
and prior use (usually a statutory bar).  The dataset includes no cases on patentable subject
matter,whichtendtoreachtheFederalCircuitbyappealfromtheBoard’srefusaltoissuea
patent.Severalofthosevariablesappeartovarywithvalidity(Figure1).Reversingdecisions,
unanimous decisions, and decisions involving drafting issues are more likely to find patents

3

Itisnotnecessarilytheonlymeasure.Forexample,LeiandWright(2009)usesuccess
ofparallelapplicationsintheEUasaproxyforthequalityofapplicationsfiledwiththePTO,
and consider whether the share of relevant prior art located before the patent is issued
correlates positively with success in the prosecution of EU applications.  Because validity
considerations in that process differ markedly from those in the United States process, we
doubtthevalidityofgeneralizationsfromthosefindingstotheUSpopulation.
4

Thus,weexcludecasesinwhichtheFederalCircuitvacatesavaliditydeterminationof
alowercourtandremandsforfurtherconsideration.Atthesametime,weincludesummary
decisionsonvalidity,reasoningthatcasesinwhichvalidityissoclearthatitdoesnotrequire
extended explanation are useful data points for a dataset seeking to identify objective
differences between patents that are and are not valid.  This distinguishes our work from
AllisonandLemley(1998),whoalsoincludeddistrictcourtdeterminationsandnonfinalFederal
Circuitdecisions.ThehighrateofreversalincasesappealedtotheFederalCircuitsuggestsit
would not be useful to rely on district court determinations that were not appealed as
conclusiveevidenceofvalidityorinvalidity(BurkandLemley2009:28).
5

 Although several of the patents were repeatedly litigated, none had inconsistent
outcomes.The40%validityrateisofcourseasubstantialdropofffromtheearlydaysofthe
FederalCircuit,whenabout55%ofpatentswerefoundvalid(Dunner1985;Lemley1994).
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valid; affirming decisions, dissenting decisions, and decisions involving prior art questions are
morelikelytofindpatentsinvalid.

3.2

FacialCharacteristicsofPatents(Delphion)

Wenextcollectedaboutfifteenvariablesthataresusceptibleofautomatedcollection,
largelybecausetheyareapparentonthefaceofthepatentandthusavailablefromDelphion.
Thesearethevariablesrelatedtothenumberofclaims,independentclaims,referencesinthe
patent, and the like that have dominated the existing literature.  As discussed above, it was
important to take account of the apparent variations in those features over time and
technologytype.Foreachofthe366mainpatents,weselectedaseriesofmatchedpatents,
permittingustoquantifythedifferenceontherelevantvariablebetweenthemainpatentand
thetypicalvaluesofthematchingpatents.Thematchedpatentsweredesignedtoprovidea
robustcontrolforthetimeofissuanceandtypeoftechnology.
Specifically,weidentifiedforeachofthemainpatentsallofthepatentswithanissue
datewithinsixmonthsoftheissuedateofthemainpatentthatincludedintheirclassifications
boththesamemainIPCclassandthesamemainUSclass.Wethenrandomlyselectedthirtyof
thematchingpatents(exceptinonecasewheretherewereonlythirteenmatchedpatents,all
of which we used).  To standardize the relation between the main patent and the matched
patents, we calculated on each of the variables the mean and standard deviation for the
matchedpatents.Weusedastandardizedvalueequaltothedifferencebetweenthefeature
on the main patent and the mean of that feature on the matched patent, divided by the
standarddeviationofthatfeatureonthematchedpatents.
Table1displaysthemeansforrepresentativestandardizedvariables,byvaliditygroup.
For the most part the differences between litigated patents and their matches point in the
directionsweexpected.Thus,allofthevariablesforclaimsandreferencesarelargerforboth
classesoflitigatedpatents(validandinvalid)thantheirmatches.Thisreplicatesthefindingsin
the existing literature that associates those features with patents likely to be selected for
litigation.
Ontheotherhand,adifferentpatternemergeswhenwecomparethevalidpatentsto
theinvalidpatents.Here,therelationbetweenvalidityandtheclaimsvariablesis,ifanything,
inverse:thedifferencefromthematchesislessforthevalidpatentsthanitisfortheinvalid
patents.  This could suggest either that those patents are more exposed to invalidation
(because they have more claims) or that they are more likely to overclaim.  At least in this
bivariateanalysis,thelatterhypothesisdrawssupportfromthestrongrelationtovalidityofthe
lengthoftheabstract:wheretheabstractsofthevalidpatentswereshorterthantheabstracts
of their matches, the abstracts of the invalid patents were substantially longer than the
abstracts of their matches.  Conversely, all of the reference variables (total references, U.S.
references,foreignreferences,andNPPA)relatepositivelytovalidity:thedifferencefromthe
matchesisgreaterforthevalidpatentsthanitisfortheinvalidpatents.Thisresonateswith
theideathatpatentsissuedafteramorethoroughcanvassingofpriorartaremorelikelytobe
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valid.6Thenumberofclassesintowhichapatentisclassifiedhasaslightpositiverelationto
validity, perhaps because the breadth of classes reflects a more careful search.  Finally, the
variables measuring the number of related patents have strong positive relations to litigation
(they are positive for both valid and invalid patents) and strong inverse relations to validity.
This well might reflect more aggressive patenting strategies for more important and
controversial inventions.  The multivariate analysis discussed below considers more carefully
theextenttowhichanyofthosedifferenceshaveanimportantrelationtovalidity.

3.3

TextͲBasedFeatures

Becausethevalidityofpatentsultimatelyrelatestotheactualtextofthepatents,we
also analyzed textͲbased features of the main patents.  These allow us to quantify the
differences in these features between the main patents and the set of matched patents
discussedabove.Patentexpertspointregularlytothedegreeofalignmentoftheclaimsand
the patent body as an important quality component. Accordingly, we analyze the text of the
patenttocapturethedegreeofalignmentofthetextofthevariouspartsofthepatent.7The
firststepistoremovewordstoocommonforusefulanalysis(“the,”“and,”“for,”etc.).Thenext
step is stemming, a process to reduce inflected (or sometimes derived) words to their stem,
baseorrootform(Porter1980).OncewehaveareduceduniverseofwordsW,werepresent
theclaimsandthedescriptionofapatentpasanindicatorvectorthatis1ifagivenwordinthe
universeispresentand0otherwise.Wethencalculatethemeasureofalignmentbetweenthe
claims and the specification as the Euclidean norm on the difference of the two indicator
vectors.
1/ 2

Alignment ( p )

CV ( p )  DV ( p )

§
2·
¨ ¦ cv( p ) i  dv( p ) i ¸
© iW
¹


Becausethismeasureisadistance,itincreasesiftheclaimsanddescriptionarepoorly
aligned.Accordingly,wewouldexpectthismeasuretocorrelateinverselywithvalidity.8This

6

WenotethecontraryhypothesisinLeiandWright(2009),thatexaminerssearchprior
art more carefully in the case of patents they believe to be weak, but find that hypothesis
unsupported in our dataset.  Our working supposition is that their findings are related to
systematicdifferencesbetweentheconceptsofvaliditythatgovernprosecutionintheEUand
beforethePTO.
7

OurdatacollectionresemblesLichtman2004initsrelianceonanautomatedtextual
assessmentofthepatentdocuments.Wherehisgoal,though,wastoconsiderthequantityof
changes during the prosecution process, our goal is to develop an automated tool that can
assessthetextualfeaturesofthedocumentthatrelatecloselytoitsvalidity.
8

 We chose to rely on an indicator rather than a count representation to avoid size
effectscausedbythedifferencesinrelativelengthbetweenclaimsandthedescriptionsearlier
inthepatent.Italsoisrelevantthatweanalyzewhetherthespecificationmentionstheterms
intheclaims,notnecessarilyiftheyoccurwithsimilarfrequency.
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expectationisbornoutbyabivariatecomparison:themeanvectorforvalidpatentsis22.7;the
meanvectorforinvalidpatentsis24.2.

3.4

ProsecutionHistoryData

Becauseamajorgoalofourprojectistoidentifyrelationsbetweentheapplicationand
prosecutionprocess,ontheonehand,andtheultimatequestionofvalidity,ontheotherhand,
wehandͲcollectedthirtyadditionalvariablesfromtheprosecutionhistoriesoftheapplications
andfromthesubsequentlyissuedpatents,generallyfallingintosixdistinctcategories.9First,
we collected the number of classes and subclasses searched during the prosecution process,
reasoning that those items would provide information about the rigor of the prosecution
process.
Second,wecollectedinformationaboutthenumberofclaimsandindependentclaims
intheapplication.Thisinformationshouldshedlightontwoseparatequestions.Byallowing
ustoquantifytheextenttowhichtheprosecutionprocessreducesthenumberofclaimsinthe
patent,thesedatashouldprovideameasureoftherigoroftheprosecutionprocess.Similarly,
byallowingustoexaminedataaboutindependentclaimsinadditiontototalclaims,wehavea
second and arguably more precise method for measuring the aggressiveness of drafting
reflectedintheapplication.
Third,wecollectedinformationfromtheInformationDisclosureStatements(IDS)often
filed with patent applications (typically on a PTO Form 1449).  The intuition here is that
applicationsinwhichtheinventordidfileanIDSandincludedagreatershareofthepriorart
ultimatelylocatedduringtheprosecutionareofhigherqualitythanthoseapplicationsthatdid
notincludeanIDSorthatdisclosedalowershareofthepriorartultimatelylocatedduringthe
prosecution.
Fourth, we calculated two separate measures of the time in examination – the time
fromapplicationtoissuance,andthetimefromthefirstofficeactiontoissuance.Becauseof
differential backlogs in art units in the PTO, we hypothesized that a measure of examination
time running from the first substantive action by the examiner was an alternative and
potentiallymoreaccuratemeasureoftherigoroftheprosecutionprocess.


9

 Two separate coders examined each prosecution history, and one of the principal
investigatorsresolvedallinconsistenciesincodingbypersonalexaminationoftherelevantfiles.
TestsofinterͲcoderreliabilityfindanaccuracyrateof94.6%.Becauseotherresearchers(e.g.,
Alcácer et al. 2009) have used PAIR data as a source for information about prosecution
histories), we separately collected PAIR data on the features that are available from PAIR.  It
appearsthatthePAIRdatasubstantiallyundercounttheitemswecollected.So,forexample,
the PAIR data find 219 IDS filings in the 333 patents from our dataset for which PAIR data is
available,whileourhandͲcollecteddatalocated275IDSfilingsforthe362patentsforwhichwe
obtainedprosecutionhistories.Becauseoftheundercounting,wedonotuseanyPAIRdatain
themodelswepresentinthispaper.
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Fifth,wecollectedinformationaboutthestepsofinteractionbytheexaminerandthe
applicant.  On the part of the examiner, we counted the number of times that the examiner
rejected the patent before ultimately granting the application as well as a number of data
pointsaboutthebasisfortherejections.Onthepartoftheapplicant,wecountedthenumber
of separate times that the applicant amended the claims in a substantial way (with separate
calculationsforamendmentsofdependentandindependentclaims).
Finally,wecollectedseveralmiscellaneousitemsthatarelikelytoappearrarelybutthat
might correlate with quality ex post.  The most important of these relate to counterpart
applications in other countries and appellate processes inside the PTO.  On the first point,
counterpartapplicationsfiledintheEUorJapanshouldindicatethattheapplicanthadahigh
exanteestimationofthevalueofthepatentandthusshouldcorrelatewithapplicanteffortin
preparing the application.  Moreover the parallel search and examination effort should be
reflectedinahigherlevelofapplicanteffortonthemainpatentapplicationinthedataset.On
the second, information about patents issued after a notice of appeal by the applicant has
ambiguous connotations.  On the one hand, it indicates a patent issued after an unusually
carefulprocess,whichmightsignalexpostquality.Ontheotherhand,italsoindicatesapatent
astowhichtheexaminercametoadefinitiveconclusionofinvalidity,whichmightrelatetoa
lack of quality ex post.   Table 2 provides summary statistics by validity group for selected
prosecutionhistoryvariables.

4.

Analysis

4.1

AnalyticalStrategy

ThedatacollectionrestsonagroupofpatentsforwhichtheFederalCircuithasmade
final rulings of validity or invalidity.  Thus, the research design assumes that the difference
betweenthosegroupsisdichotomous,sothatitisappropriatetocomparethecharacteristics
ofthetwogroupsofpatentswithmultivariatelogisticregression.Thatassumptionconfronts
severalchallenges.Foronething,theFederalCircuitdoesnotoftenruleonthevalidityofan
entirepatent.Mostcases(andallofthecasesinthedataset)involvechallengestothevalidity
ofsomeparticularclaimorsubsetofclaims.Thus,whentheFederalCircuitupholdsaclaimof
invalidity,itleavesintacttheclaimsinthepatentthatwerenotchallenged.Conversely,when
it rejects a claim of invalidity, it says nothing at all about the validity of claims not before it.
Similarly, the legal significance of decisions finding claims valid and invalid is not precisely
obverse.  A decision invalidating a claim is much more complete than a decision validating a
claim:oncetheFederalCircuitinvalidatesaclaim,thematterisforallpracticalpurposesfinally
resolved.  A decision that the patent is valid, on the other hand, technically means nothing
more than that the particular legal question presented to the Federal Circuit was not an
adequatebasisforrejectingthepatent.10


10

Ourconcernonthispointmotivatedourdecisiontoexcludenonfinaldecisionsfrom
ourdataset.
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Although those problems undermine the dichotomous nature of validity in a technical
way,inpracticewefindthemunimportant.Giventhecostsanddelayinvolvedinlitigationto
theFederalCircuit,itislikelythatlitigantschallengingapatentbeforetheFederalCircuitwill
challengeclaimsthathaveeconomicsignificance.Itisthusnotunreasonabletosupposethata
decisioninvalidating(orvalidating)thoseclaimssayssomethingimportantaboutthefailure(or
success) of the prosecution process in adequately demarcating the invention the patent
discloses.  Similarly, litigants that press validity challenges to a final decision in the Federal
Circuitarelikelytoraisethestrongestchallengestovalidityinthefirstinstance.Thecostsof
litigationarequitehigh,andlitigantshavenoincentivetoretaintheirbestchallengesforlater
appeals;indeed,doctrinesrelatedtopreclusionandthelawofthecasewellmightlimittheir
abilitytopresentsubsequentchallengestothesameclaims.
Tobespecific,theoccurrencethatwouldundermineouranalyticalframewouldbethat
apatentthatenduredachallengeintheFederalCircuitwasinvalidinanimportantway(either
withrespecttotheclaimsatissueinthefirstcaseorwithrespecttosomeothersetofclaims).
ButthereisnocaseinthedatasetinwhichtheFederalCircuitrejectedthefirstchallengeto
validity and accepted a second challenge; for each of the seven patents that returned to the
FederalCircuitafteraninitialholdingofvalidity,theFederalCircuitrejectedsubsequentvalidity
challenges.Thereverseisequallytrue;fortheonlypatenttoreturntotheFederalCircuitafter
aninitialfindingofinvalidity(theclaimantraisingabroaderinvalidityclaim),theFederalCircuit
accepted the second invalidity challenge as well.  Similarly, buttressing our hypothesis that
litigation in the Federal Circuit is likely to focus on the core claims of the patent, we note
considerable overlap in the claims involved in repeat litigation: for four of the eight repeatͲ
litigationpatentsthesameclaimswereatissueineachFederalCircuitcase.Forthreeofthe
otherstherewassubstantialoverlap,sothatonecommonclaimwasinvolvedineachcase.For
onlyonepatentdidtherepeatedappearancesinvolvedifferentclaims.Insum,recognizingthe
technical concern, we believe as a practical matter that the difference between patents that
stand and fall in the Federal Circuit is sufficiently important to justify analyzing that
determination in a dichotomous way.  At worst, it suggests a measurement error that would
makeitmoredifficultforthestatisticalanalysistodiscernpatternsthatexistinthedata.
Because the collection of data from the prosecution histories required individualized
analysisofthosefiles,itwasnotfeasibletoprovidetherobustmatchingforthosedatapoints
that the standardization process provided for the variables that could be collected through
automatedprocesses.Thus,thedatasetincludesbothalargegroupofvariablesforwhichwe
have no matching information and also a set of variables that use matching; comparison of
valid and invalid patents on the matched variables provides a differenceͲinͲdifference look at
therelationbetweenthosevariablesandvalidity.
To take advantage of all of the information in the dataset, it is necessary to estimate
models that include both the standardized variables and the unstandardized variables.  This
raises a number of concerns, the most obvious of which is the possibility that some
combinationoftechnologyclassandperiodicitymightexplainrelationsintheunstandardized

12|P a g e 


variables.  In particular, controls for those concepts might be inadequate if they require
extrapolationbeyondtherangeofthedata.11
To assess how problematic it is to use both the standardized and unstandardized
variables in the dataset, we estimated the logistic regression models described below
separately – once using the standardized variables where available and once using the
unstandardizedformsofthesamevariables.Althoughthecoefficientsshiftedsomewhat,for
themostparttheresultswerequitesimilar.Accordingly,weconcludethatthetechnologyand
timecontrolsfunctionadequately.Nevertheless,asaconservativeanalyticalapproachweuse
standardizedvariablesforalloftheconceptsforwhichtheyareavailable.
Becauseourprojectrelatesdirectlytotheprosecutionprocess,wedifferentiatepatents
based on the technology centers in which the PTO examines them.12  Recognizing that the
implicit premise of the statistical analysis below is that patent validity is a static and timeͲ
invariant characteristic of patents, it is problematic to recognize that the Federal Circuit’s
perspective of what types of patents are valid and invalid doubtless has shifted during the
periodbetweentheissuanceofthepatentsinthedataset(theoldestofwhichwasissuedin
1975)andthepointsintimeatwhichtheFederalCircuitassessedtheirvalidity.Aswediscuss
inmoredetailbelow,theapparentvariationrelatedtotimeandtechnologywasanimportant
factorinthedesignofthedatacollectionandanalysis.
Because the dataset contains a large number of variables (188) in comparison to the
number of observations (366), and becausemany of the variables are closely related to each
other, it was not useful for our regressions to include all of the variables in the dataset.
Accordingly, we started by organizing the variables into a number of distinct concepts that
shouldrelatetovalidity.Usingmultiplevariablesfromanyoneofthosecategorieswouldpose
obvious problems of collinearity: the variables for total claims, independent claims, and
dependent claims, for example, correlate closely among themselves.13  Accordingly, we

11

 To enhance our ability to understand how the relevant variables relate to different
technology centers, we also estimated multilevel models that allow us to observe how the
effectsoftheexplanatoryvariablesdifferbytechnologycenter.Becausethosemodelsdidnot
reveal significant variation by technology center, we do not report them here.  They do,
however,buttressourperspectivethatthetechnologycontrolsareadequate.Thedatasetalso
includes PTO data about features of the process that differ by technology center (number of
examiners,backlog,etc.).Noneofthatdataappearstorelatesignificantlytovalidity.
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 Prior scholarship has used ad hoc classifications loosely based on the topͲlevel IPC
codes (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004).   We attempted to
replicatetheclassificationfromLanjouwandSchankerman(2004),butneithertheauthorsnor
thejournalhaveretainedthedatanecessarytodoso.
13

 We also used principal component analysis to extract factors from the multiple
variablesforeachconcept,butgenerallytheuseoffactorsdidnotimprovetheresultsrelative
to using representative variables for each concept, and the difficulty of interpreting the
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endeavored to identify a single representative variable or small number of variables for each
separate concept, based largely on a theoretical understanding of the likely relations of the
variablestovalidity.14
Finally, ascontrols for robustness, we repeated our analysis on distinct subsets of the
dataset,usingthefeaturesoftheFederalCircuitdecisiontosegmentthedataset.Thus,where
theresultsbelowarebasedonalloftheobservationsinthedataset,werepeatedthatanalysis
omittingallofthepatentsinwhichtherewasadissent;becausejudgesontheFederalCircuit
disagreedaboutthevalidityofthosepatents,wereasonablymightregardthemaslessclearly
markedvalidorinvalid.
A related issue is the circumstance that many of the Federal Circuit decisions in the
dataset addressed the validity of multiple patents within the same opinion.  Because those
opinionsshowedaslighttendencytoconcludethatall(oralmostall)patentsinthegroupwere
validorinvalid,wewereconcernedthatthoseobservationswerenotindependent.Torespond
tothatconcern,theresultswesummarizebelowincludetwosetsofstandarderrors.Thefirst
areconventionalstandarderrorsclusteredontheseparatejudicialdecisions.Thesecondresult
fromasimulationthatusedasinglerandomlyselectedpatentfromeachoftheFederalCircuit
decisionsfor10,000repetitions;wereportbootstrappedstandarderrorsfromtheresults.
A final segmentation of the data took account of subject matter coding of the issues
addressedbytheFederalCircuit.Specifically,werepeatedouranalysisseparatelyfortheprior
art and drafting cases, reasoning that the covariates should relate differently to those two
categoriesofcases.Noneofthoserobustnesscheckssuggestedinstabilityintheresultsthat
wepresentbelow.

4.2

AnalyzingPatentValidity

Becausethepurposeofouranalysisistounderstandtheextenttowhichtheactivities
oftheapplicantandtheexaminerinteracttofoster(orundermine)thevalidityofthepatents
that issue, we present three distinct models, reflecting three different points in the process.
ThefirstsetislimitedtoinformationabouttheinitialsubmissionoftheapplicanttothePTO:
the characteristics of the application itself and any IDS filings that the applicant submits in
support.Thesecondsetincludesbothinformationabouttheapplicant’sinputtotheprocess
andtheactivitiesoftheapplicant,examiner,andBoardduringtheprocessitself.Thethirdset
addsinformationapparentonlyfromtheissuedpatent(suchasthestandardizedvariablesthat
comparetheissuedpatenttocontemporaneouspatentsinsimilartechnologyareas).


coefficientsonthosefactorsultimatelypersuadedustoreportmodelsthatuserepresentative
variables.
14

Amongotherthings,thisresultedintheomissionofsubstantiallyallofthevariables
forwhichstandardizationisappropriate.Forreasonsdiscussedabove,wehadlittletheoretical
reason to expect a strong relation between validity and such things as claims, pages, and
forward references; because our statistical analysis was consistent with our theoretical
expectations,wedidnotincludeanyofthosevariablesinthefinalmodels.
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Before we describe those results, it is useful to note the empirical challenge we face.
ThereismuchthatmightinfluenceaFederalCircuitdecisiononthevalidityofapatentthatis
not determined at the moment that the PTO issues the patent. The value of the patent may
influence the vigor with which the patentee will defend it and with which an infringer will
attackit.Theperspectiveofthetrialjudgeandjurywillshapefactualfindingsandtherecord
that will be available to the appellate court.  Expert witnesses may influence the juries’
understandingoftheinventionandthestateoftheart.Thequalityoftheattorneysinthetrial
and appellate courts will significantly affect how the courts perceive the relevant legal
questions.AllwouldagreethattheidentitiesofthejudgesontheFederalCircuitpanelchosen
toresolvetheappealwillhavesomeinfluenceonhowthecaseisdecided.15To putitmore
directly,evenanobserverdeeplycommittedtotheintegrityandobjectivityofthelegalprocess
would be surprised if quantitative information about a patent could provide enough
information to accurately predict the likelihood that the Federal Circuit would find any
particular patent valid or invalid.  Recognizing those difficulties, we think that the statistical
analysiswepresentbelowwassurprisinglysuccessful.Forexample,theversionthatusesdata
fromallthreestagescorrectlyclassifies74%ofthepatentsandhasageneralizedR2of22%.16
Table 3 summarizes the logistic regression analysis.  At a global level, the most
interestingthingisthatevenwiththeinclusionofthestandardizedvariables,manyofthemost
importantdatapointsarehandͲcollectedfeaturesfromtheprosecutionhistory.Thissuggests
that a reliable understanding of patent validity cannot rest on information from the face of
patents alone, but instead depends on features of the process that produced the patents in
question.  On the other hand, even data available from the applicant alone provide
considerableinformation,correctlyclassifying68%ofthepatents.Turningfromtheanalysisas
a whole to the individual concepts, it is useful to discuss in turn what the analysis suggests
abouttherelationbetweeneachofthoseconceptsandtheultimatequestionofpatentvalidity.
Technological Breadth:  Several variables in the dataset relate to the technological
breadth of the invention.  Among other things, we have data about the number of inventors
andseveraldifferentmetricsofthenumberofclassesintowhichthepatentisclassified(both
under the United States system and under the IPC system).  Although existing literature
suggests that the number of inventors relates to the diffusion of knowledge (Wuchty et al.
2007), it appears not to relate in any significant way to validity.  Given the ease with which
additionalindividualscanbelistedasinventorsonapatent,thiswasnotsurprisingtous.We
donotincludeanyinventorvariablesintheanalysisthatwereporthere.
At the same time, the number of classes into which the patent is classified has a
significantandpositiverelationtovalidity.Thecoefficientsuggests(atthereferencevaluesof
the other variables) that each additional class into which the patent falls (the mean is four

15

 For example, Judge Gajarsa ruled in favor of validity for 73% of the patents he
considered,whileJudgeMooreruledinfavorofvalidityonly21%ofthetime.Similarlyreversal
ratesrangedfrom35%(JudgeDyk)to11%(JudgeMayer).
16

 We use generalized R2 here as a rough measure of the explanatory power of the

models.
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classes) increases the likelihood of validity by about nine percentage points.   The results on
thatvariableinitiallysurprisedus.Ourinitialhypothesishadbeenthataninventionspanning
multipleclasseswouldbeamoreambitiousinventionandthusmoresusceptibleofinvalidation
because of the multiplicity of technologies from which relevant art might be found.  On
reflection,however,ourinitialhypothesisseemstoreflectafailuretodistinguishbetweenthe
ambitionofwhattheinventorclaimsandtheabilityoftheprosecutionprocesstoidentifythe
significanceofthedisclosedinvention.Ifweholdotherimportantfeaturesofthepatentand
theprocessconstant,thenumberofclassesintowhichtheinventionisclassifiedmightbetter
be understood as reflecting the success of the applicant and examiner in understanding the
entire range of technology over which the invention operates.  This perspective treats the
variable as a proxy for quality of the joint search.  Another explanation would be that these
highly crossͲclassified patents often are issued in arts in which the classifications are poorly
organized.  Poorly organized classifications, in turn, are likely to reflect rapid growth in the
technology.  From this perspective, crossͲclassification of patents might be a proxy for
innovationinacuttingͲedgearea.
ScopeofProtection:Giventhefocusoftheexistingliteratureonclaims(largelybecause
oftherelativeeaseofobtainingthatinformation),weexploredseveraldifferentvariablesthat
mightcapturethescopeofprotection.Weexploredvariablesfortotalclaimsandindependent
claims,inboththepatentandtheapplication,forthelengthofthepatent(inpages)andofthe
abstract (in words).  For most of those variables we examined both standardized and
unstandardized forms.  We also explored quadratic forms of several of these variables to
capturethepossibilitythatthesevariablesmightbeimportantonlyattheextremes.Theonly
claimsͲrelated variable that differs substantially from zero is independent claims in the
application,whichismarginallynegativeandappearsattheapplicantandprosecutionstages,
with a coefficient that suggests each additional independent claim in the application reduces
thelikelihoodoffinalvaliditybyonetotwopercentagepoints.
As discussed above, the existing literature has emphasized a positive connection
between the number of claims and value.  The data suggest, however, that the existing
literaturereflectslittlemorethantherealitythatpatentswithmoreclaimsaremorelikelyto
beselectedintolitigationthanpatentswithfewerclaims.Itiseasytosuggesthypothesesthat
would relate the number of claims or complexity of the patent to validity.  For example, a
patentwithmoreclaimsnecessarilyhasmoreplacesinwhichmistakescouldhavebeenmade.
Conversely,apatentwithamorecomplexclaimstructureismorelikelytoincludeaclaimjust
broad enough to successfully attack a competitor: decreasing the likelihood that the alleged
infringer can repel an infringement claim by showing that the asserted claim is overly broad.
Perhaps there is some truth to both of those stories.  In this dataset, at least, none of those
variablesrelatesstronglytovalidity.
Giventheweaknessoftherelationbetweenindependentclaimsandvalidity,thefinal
model omits that variable in preference for a variable that counts counterpart patents in the
European Union and Japan (a variable available only for the final model).  We collected that
data based on the notion that patents in those offices might reflect the most economically
significant extensions of the invention.  As suggested above, this variable and the related
variablesappeartorelatepositivelytolitigationandnegativelytovalidity.Inthefinalmodel,
16|P a g e 


thecoefficientsuggeststhateachmajoradditionalpatentreducesthelikelihoodofvalidityby
abouttenpercentagepoints.
We originally collected the data on patent families because of an expectation that
patents subjected to the prosecution processes of the European and Japanese patent offices
would display a higher quality, both because of the benefits of a parallel examination and
searchandbecauseofthereputedlyhighercapabilitiesofthoseoffices.
The family variables, however, suggest an inverse relation to validity.  Our best
explanation is that it reflects different national standards for patent drafting.  Attorneys
experiencedinmultinationalpatentprosecutionhaveexplainedtousthatstrategiesforpatent
draftingintheEUandJapanarequitedifferentfromthoseintheUnitedStates.Ifcompanies
first draft their patents for prosecution in an EU or Japanese office, they well might produce
applicationsfortheUnitedStatespatentofficethatarelesswelldesignedfortheUnitedStates
patenting process, and thus less likely to result in valid patents within that system.  Another
possibility suggested to us by early readers is that companies seek multiͲnational protection
onlyfortheirmostimportantpatents,andthatinthosecasesthey(ortheircounsel)mightbe
moreinterestedinaggressivelybroadpatentingineachcountry,losingsightoftheirinterestin
restrictingtheirclaimstoalineofclearvalidity.17
ApplicantSearch:Asdiscussedabove,severalvariablesrelatedtotheapplicant’ssearch
effort have significantly positive bivariate correlations with validity.  We include the general
number of IDS filings and the number of references in those filings (both reflecting the
applicant’s contribution to the patent search effort).  We omit the references variable in the
finalmodelbecauseitseemstobecollinearwithothervariablesincludedinthatmodelthatare
not available for the earlierͲstage models.  All of those variables have positive coefficients
significantly different from zero in all three models.  The coefficients suggest that each
additional IDS filing (the mean is 1.6 filings) relates to an increased likelihood of validity of
about five percentage points, and that each ten additional IDS references increases the
likelihoodofvaliditybyaboutonehalfofapercentagepoint.
Office Search Effort: As discussed above, we collected data about changes from the
referencesintheIDStothereferencesinthefinalpatent.18Atthesecondandthirdstageswe
includethenumberofU.S.referencesaddedbytheexaminer.Thatvariableisinverselyrelated
to validity, with a coefficient that suggests that each reference added (the mean is seven
examinerͲadded U.S. references) is associated with a twoͲpoint decrease in the likelihood of
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Severalreadersofearlydraftshavesuggestedthatvalidityproblemscanbeascribed
to conflicting motivations of the patenting company (with a more conservative motivation in
validity) and their outside counsel (with a slightly different aggressive interest in displaying
zeal).  Although the idea is intriguing, the data structure available to us does not make it
practicaltoexplorethoseissuesinthispaper.
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We are not aware of any data source that previously has examined patents cited by the
applicantandomittedfromthefinalpatentbytheexaminer.
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validity.Generally,patentsissuedaftertheapplicantdoesapoorjobofidentifyingtherelevant
priorart(eitherbecauseitfailstosubmitrelevantartorbecauseitsubmitsirrelevantart)areof
lower quality.  Even though the examiner might expend considerable effort eliminating the
referencesprovidedbytheapplicantandaddingnewreferencesbasedontheexaminer’sown
search,thedatasuggestthattheweaknessoftheapplicationpersists.Thisbuttressestheidea,
discussedabove,thattherobustnessofthepriorartsearchoftheapplicanthasindependent
value for the quality of the application, even apart from the likelihood that the application
would be subject to challenge as anticipated or obvious.  It is possible, to be sure, that the
substantialchangeinreferencesbetweenIDSandpatentsignalonlythattheexaminerchoseto
workharderontheapplicationbecauseofanapparentdefect.Thepointofimportanceforus,
however,isthatwhateversignaledtotheexaminertheneedforunusualeffort,itappearsto
correlatewithapooridentificationofpriorartbytheapplicant.
Office Actions: Building on that concern, we include at the second and third stages a
variable for office actions based on unlisted references (a crossͲcutting descriptive category
determined by individualized examination of the office action document).  The coefficient is
positiveandsignificantlydifferentfromzero,suggestingthateachsuchrejectionincreasesthe
likelihoodofvaliditybyninetotenpercentagepoints.Juxtaposedwiththedatasummarized
above(abouttheadverseimplicationsofaprocessinwhichanexamineraddsalargenumber
of references), this finding suggests that it is not enough for the examiner to locate relevant
prior art the applicant fails to cite.  What seems to be valuable in the process is that the
examinerlocateinvalidatingpriorartthat,byhypothesis,forcestheapplicanttoreshapethe
claims.  The feature of the process that relates to validity is the office action rejecting the
application.
PostͲExaminerActions:Thefinaltwostagesincludethreedistinctvariablestoaccount
foractivitybywhichapplicantscanaltertheresultsofthedecisionsoftheexaminers:seeking
continuations, seeking review from the Board, and seeking amendments of the patent under
Rules 312.  All three of those variables have large and significant coefficients that correlate
negativelywithvalidity.TheestimatessuggeststhateachcontinuationisassociatedwithasixͲ
point decrease in the likelihood of validity, that the issuance of patents only after Board
decisions is associated with a 50Ͳpoint decline in the likelihood of validity, and that Rule 312
amendmentsareassociatedwitha22Ͳpointdeclineinthelikelihoodofvalidity.
Total Research: The prior literature has emphasized a strong relation between the
numberofreferencesinthefinalpatentandthepatent’svalue.Because,holdingotherthings
constant,thenumberofreferencesismorelikelytoreflectthequalityofthesearchthanthe
value of the underlying invention, it would be natural for this variable (unlike the claims
variable)alsotorelatepositivelytovalidity.Atthesametime,itisreasonabletoexpectthat
the variables gleaned from the prosecution history would measure that concept more
accurately.  Thus, it was not surprising that variables measuring total references, U.S.
references,andnonͲpatentpriorarthavelittleforceinthemultivariateanalysis.Accordingly,
weincludeonlythevariableforforeignreferences,whichispositiveandsignificantlydifferent
fromzero.Thecoefficientsuggeststhateachadditionalforeignreference(themeanisthree)
relates to an increase in the likelihood of validity of almost two percentage points.  The
intuitionhereisthatthegreatestvariationinsearchqualityrelatesnottoU.S.patents(asto
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whichroutineexaminerskillshouldbeadequate)buttoforeignpatents,whereitmaybemore
difficulttolocatetherelevantart.
DraftingQuality:Weincludeinthefinalmodelthevectorthatcomparesthetextofthe
specificationtothetextoftheclaims.AfterthedecisioninPhillipsv.AWHCorporation,415
F.3d1303(Fed.Cir.2005)(enbanc)accentuatedtheimportanceofusingthespecificationto
interpret the claims, conformity between the claims and the specification will be especially
importantinassessingchallengestotheenablementanddefinitenessofthepatent.Also,given
that validity against prior art is determined by comparing the prior art to what is claimed, a
precise determination of claim meaning is critical to clear validity determinations.  Thus, it is
notsurprisingthatthedistancebetweentheconceptsarticulatedinthespecificationandthe
conceptsarticulatedintheclaimsisnegativelycorrelatedtovalidity.
Time:Thetimecontrolissignificant,underscoringtheimportanceofaccountingforthe
ageofthepatent.Wehaveexperimentedwithdifferentmeasuresoftime(applicationdate,
firstactiondate,andissuedate),19buthavesettledonapplicationdatebecausethatseemsto
us the date that fits best with a theory that emphasizes the process from application to
issuance.Scatterplotssuggestthattheeffectoftimeisroughlylinear.Thecoefficientssuggest
thatthelikelihoodofvaliditydeclinesbyaboutthreeandahalfpercentagepointsforeachlater
calendar year of the application date (1998 applications would result in patents almost four
percentagepointslesslikelytobevalidthan1997applications).

5.

Implications

Building specific policy recommendations on the analysis above would be a delicate
matter.BecausethedatasetusesapopulationofvaliditydecisionsfromtheFederalCircuit,it
isreasonabletotreattheresultsasareliabledescriptionofthecharacteristicsassociatedwith
favorable and adverse decisions by that Court.  This is of course an important question in its
ownright.ButiftheultimategoalistounderstandthequalityoftheworkdonebythePTO,we
mustconsiderwhethertheFederalCircuitdataissufficientlyrepresentativetomakeitfairto
generalizefromdataaboutthosepatentstoconclusionsaboutthemuchlargerpopulationof
issuedpatents.
Althoughthepopulationofissuedpatentsisindeedanorderofmagnitudelargerthan
the group of Federal Circuit patents we examine here, basic principles of statistical inference
suggest that it is not unreasonable to make findings about the larger population using the
approach we present here.  This is not because there are no systematic differences between
the patents that do and do not reach the Federal Circuit.  Of course there are, as the large
coefficientsinTable1demonstrate.Norisitbecausenoneofthevariablesthataffectselection
intotheFederalCircuitrelatetovalidity,becausevaliditysurelyisrelevanttothatprocess.
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 These measures of the time when the patent was examined are distinct from
measuresofthelengthoftimeforwhichapatentwasexamined.Asdiscussedabove,wedo
notfindanysignificantrelationsbetweenthedurationofexaminationandvalidity.
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But that is not the relevant question.  The relevant question is whether one of the
variablesinourstatisticalanalysishasadifferentrelationtovalidityforthepatentsthatdoand
donotreachtheFederalCircuit.Incausalterminology,wemakenostrongclaimsaboutthe
internalvalidityoftheinferencesthatmightbedrawnfromthedata.Wehavenoexperimental
data,anditwouldbequitedifficulttoconstructanexperimentthatwouldpermitidentification
of treatment and control groups (effectively examining the variation in a single patent
characteristic while randomizing everything else).  A separate concern about external validity
(generalizability)arisesifthereisaninteractionbetweenselectionintoFederalCircuitreview
andtheeffectsoftheindependentvariables.
Given the infrequent nature of Federal Circuit review, and its dependency on factors
whollyunrelatedtothepatentprosecutionprocess(suchasthevalueofthemarketonwhich
thepatentwritesandtheaggressivenessofthefirmthatholdsit),itisnoteasytoseeobvious
reasons why any of the variables should interact with selection into the Federal Circuit.
Accordingly,althoughwerecognizethatcautionisappropriate,wedobelievethatthefindings
areatleastsuggestivewithrespecttothelargeruniverseofpatentsissuedbythePTO.
Turningtothatpoint,weviewthedataanalysisassupportingathreeͲfoldshiftinthe
conceptionofpatentreform.First,ifthegoalofpatentreformistoincreasethelikelyvalidity
of the patents that the PTO issues, then the focus of reform should be on the prosecution
process, not on the procedures of postͲissuance litigation that dominate existing legislative
proposals.  Second, given the complexity of the PTO process (only glimpsed in the data
discussedabove)andthevolumeofapplicationsthatthePTOexamines,theonlyreliableway
toassessthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheprocessisthroughempiricalobservationofthat
process and its results.  Third, given the distinct capabilities that applicants and the PTO
possess,theoptimalsystemformaximizingthelikelyvalidityofissuedpatentsisoneinwhich
both applicants and the PTO have incentives to cooperate in developing and improving
applicationsofhighquality.
Thoughtheydoleadtoashiftinattentionfromexistingscholarship,thefirsttwopoints
arehardlycontroversial:whocancontendthatreformsshouldignorethepatentingprocessor
that reforms will work better if they are not informed by data?  The third point, however,
warrants some elaboration, because the conception of quality that animates our discussion
callsforafundamentalculturalshiftintheperspectivethroughwhichspecificproceduresand
reforms are evaluated.  Thus, we acknowledge a stark tension between the joint production
conceptionofouranalysisandtheperspectiveofentitlementthatpermeatesthesystem.Itis
perhapsonlyasmallexaggerationthatpatentapplicantsandtheirattorneysviewpatentslike
welfare payments: something to which they are entitled unless the agency can identify a
serious substantive defect with the request.  Conversely, the agents of the public within the
PTOaremotivatedbyapointsystemandproceduralframeworkthatgivesthemonlylimited
andindirectincentivestoimprovethequalityofapplications,andfartoolittlepowertoreject
poorapplications.
Tobesure,thesystemdoesimposesometokenobligationsontheapplicantandleaves
openarealpossibilitythatapatentmightbeunenforceablebecauseofmisconductduringthe
applicationprocess(MergesandDuffy2006:1102Ͳ40).Butingeneraltheapplicant’sdutiesare
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completewhenitsubmitsadocumentontherequisiteformandpaystheappropriatefee(Burk
and Lemley 2009:23).  At that point the burden of effort on the application shifts almost
entirelytothePTO(Rai2009:2075Ͳ76).Theentitlementperspectiveisifanythingevenmore
damagingduringtheprosecutionprocess,whereexaminersasapracticalmatterhavenoway
to dismiss weak applications (Lemley and Moore 2004; Benjamin and Rai 2007), and work
under incentive structures that provide powerful incentives to grant dubious applications
pressed by motivated applicants (Rai 2009:2062Ͳ65; Office of Inspector General 2004).  The
problem is only exacerbated by the ethical obligations zealous attorneys face to obtain the
broadestpossiblescopeofprotectionfortheirinventiveclients.
Inthatvein,thefindingsinSection4providetwodistincttypesofsupportfortheshift
inperspectivethatwepropose.First,atthegloballevel,thepredictivepoweroftheanalysis
underscores the importance of the prosecution process to the ultimate legal question of
validity.Theexistingpatentliteratureproceedsonthestaticassumptionthatapplicationsare
goodorbad,andthatlittlecanbedonetoimprovetheprocessexcepttoencouragethePTOto
moreaccuratelydeterminewhichapplicationsshouldberejected.ThefindingsofPart4reflect
a more complex and dynamic conception of the application, under which most, if not all,
applications could be improved through the application of more effort by the applicant, the
examiner,orbothworkingtogether.
Most importantly, the predictive power of the firstͲstage analysis shows that some of
whatisgoodandbadabouttheapplicationscanbediscernedreadilyatthemomenttheyreach
the patent office, and a great deal of what is good and bad about the applications can be
discernedfromwhathashappenedtothembeforetheyleavetheoffice.Thisstronglysuggests
the need for continuing research in the area, taking advantage of the unique dataͲcollection
opportunities available only to the PTO, analyzing more information about different sets of
patents(reexaminedpatents,patentsappealedtotheFederalCircuitdirectlyfromtheBoard,
etc.).Ofcentralsignificanceforthispaper,itunderscoresthepossibilitythatimprovementsin
that process could increase the share of issued patents that are valid even if those
improvementsdidnothingtoalterthepoolofincomingapplications.
Morespecifically,theanalysisinPart4suggestsavarietyofapproachesthatcouldbe
consideredtoimprovetheeffortoftheapplicant,theexaminers,andthePTOasawhole.Our
goal in all cases is to improve the incentives of both the examiners and the applicant.  In
general, we argue that the PTO should devise internal criteria to monitor “red flag”
applications, and then create incentives for applicants and examiners to revise or terminate
suchapplications.Oursuggestionsatthispointareonlyillustrative,buildingontherelations
evidentfromtheanalysisinPart4.Still,theydosuggestthatthePTOcouldimplementdataͲ
driven reforms that would improve the likely validity of the patents that issued from the
process.

5.1

ApplicantEffort

The most important change in the prosecution process would be to alter the ethic of
entitlement to one of collaboration.  The applicant should have discernible incentives to
provide the best possible application and to respond in the most effective way to concerns
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expressed by the examiner during the prosecution process, and the examiner should have
parallel incentives to provide effective feedback leading toward an issued patent that
accuratelydefinestheinnovation.Severaldistinctissuesareapparent.
5.1.1CareinDrafting
More than a quarter of the patents held invalid in the dataset suffered from drafting
problems,whichgenerallyreflectafailuretoincludeaspecificationthatadequatelydescribes
and enables an invention that is delineated with definiteness in the claims.  The textͲbased
analysiswepresentinthispapersuggeststhatitiswellwithinthereachofexistingtechnology
to design simple softwareͲbased tools that can measure the alignment between the
specification and the claims in a way that matches reasonably well to the ultimate legal
question the PTO faces when it evaluates an application.  If this is so, then without the
expenditureofanyexaminertime,applicationscouldbeobjectivelyevaluatedandsubjectedto
differentialtreatmentbasedonhowwelltheyhavebeendrafted.
Severaltypesofadministrativeresponsesareapparent.PerhapsthePTOcouldreject
poorlyalignedapplicationsoutofhandunderSection112.Thishastheadvantageofgetting
applicationsoffthePTO’sdocketandofbalancingtheworkload:iftheapplicanthasnotmetan
objectivebaselineofaligningtheclaimsandthespecificationthentheapplicationdoesnotyet
warrantathoroughexamination.Anotherapproachwouldsubjectpoorlyalignedapplications
to higher fees, reflecting an anticipated need for extra examiner time (Rai 2009).20  Or they
couldbeshuntedtoaslowtrackinwhichtheywouldreceiveextralayersofreview.21Inany
case,theexpectedresponsewouldbeforapplicantstoimprovetheirapplicationsbeforefiling
themwiththePTO,toensurethattheyavoidwhateveradversetreatmentiscontemplated.At
thatpoint,thequalityofapplicationssubmittedtothePTOmightmeasurablyimprove.Solong
as the premise holds – that the software tool accurately can test whether the specification
adequatelyconformstotheclaims–thetoolcannotbegamed,becausetheonlyresponsethat
satisfiesthetoolisaresponsethatinfactimprovesthequalityoftheapplication.22
5.1.2OverͲClaiming
To the extent the existing academic literature has discussed the number of claims in
patents, it has emphasized the positive correlation between the number of claims and the
likelihoodthatthepatentwillbelitigated,andreasonedfromthatcorrelationtotheviewthat

20

Fordiscussionoftheimportance(anddifficulty)ofenhancingPTOfeeauthority,see
Rai,supranoteError!Bookmarknotdefined.,at2067Ͳ72.
21

 The PTO already promises accelerated examination to applicants that meet certain
disclosurerequirements(UnitedStatesPatentandTrademarkOffice2006).
22

Becauseapplicationofsuchatoolwouldincreasethelikelihoodthatthespecification
matches well to the claims, it should have the ancillary salutary effect of decreasing the
uncertaintyofclaimsinterpretationthatledtotheFederalCircuit’senbancdecisioninPhillips
v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Clarity of patent boundaries is an
importantconsiderationevenapartfromvalidity(BessenandMeurer2008).
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claimscorrelatewithquality(Allisonetal.2004).Ifthatrelationweretakenseriously,itwould
bedifficulttojustifythePTO’srestrictionsonpatentswithlargenumbersofclaims.23
As discussed above, however, the data that we present here suggests no positive
correlation between the number of claims and the validity of the patent: patents with more
claimsaremorelikelytobeselectedintolitigation,butwhentheyareselectedintolitigation
they are, if anything, less likely to be held valid than those with fewer claims.  Indeed, the
multivariateanalysissuggestssuggestthatthereisnorobustrelationshipbetweenthenumber
ofclaimsandvalidity.Thereareanynumberofobviousreasons,totallyunrelatedtovalidity,
whypatentswithmoreclaimsmightmorelikelybethesubjectoflitigation.Forexample,they
mightreflectbroaderinventions,andthusbemorelikelytowriteontothegoodsandservices
ofcompetitors.Orthevariationofclaimsmightleadtheirholderstoperceiveagreaterchance
that they will be able to identify a claim that is broad enough to write on the competing
productbutnarrowenoughtowithstandvaliditychallenges.
Tobesure,itispossibletosuggestreasonswhypatentswithmoreclaimsmightmore
likelybeinvalid.Mostobviously,thebroadernumberofclaimsmightincreasethelikelihood
thatatleastoneoftheclaimsisinvalid.Butgiventhediscussionabove,itisnotatallclearthat
the marking of validity in this dataset would capture those patents as invalid; the relevant
question in Federal Circuit litigation is likely to turn on whether claims of central economic
importancecanbeupheld,andpatentswithmorereticulatedclaimsstructureswellmightfare
betterinthatvenuethanthosewithsimplerclaimsstructures.
The fact remains, however, that the data presented here do not suggest a strong
relation between the number of claims and the ultimate question of validity.  As discussed
there,thisistruedespiteoureffortstoanalyzethenumberofclaimsinavarietyoffunctional
forms.24Inourview,then,thedatapresentedherecastdoubtoneffortstouseclaimslimitsas
amethodtoimprovepatentquality.ThatisnottosaythatthePTOcouldnotidentifyother
datasets that would link particularly large numbers of claims to problems with validity.  But
given the difficulty of identifying a robust reason why the number of claims should relate
positivelyornegativelytovalidity,theabsenceofstrongsupportinthedatamakesusskeptical
thatthisshouldbeanimportantpartofthereformagenda.Wedonotdoubtthatapplications
withlargenumbersofclaimsimposelargerburdensonthePTO.Andwebelieveitmakessense
for the PTO to pass a share of theexamination costs backto applicants in the form of larger

23

 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b)(1) (2008) (discussing examination support documents for
applications with more than five independent claims or twentyͲfive total claims) (withdrawn
afterTafasv.Doll,559F.3d1345(Fed.Cir.2009)).
24

 In addition to the variables for claims and independent claims in the patent and
application, we explored variables for dependent claims, for various ratios between
independent claims and total claims for changes in the number of claims between the
application and the patent.  We also explored quadratic forms of the variables to test the
possibilitythatrelationswithvalidityoccuronlyattheextremeendsofthedistribution.None
ofthoseeffortsrevealedarobustrelationtovalidity.
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feesforsuchapplications.Butthosefeesshouldberegardedasbasedonworkload.Fornow,
thecasethattheyimprovequalityisunimpressive.
5.1.3ApplicantSearch
Previous scholars have documented in detail the dysfunction of the patent system’s
existingstructureofincentivesforapplicantstosearchandidentifyrelevantpriorart(Benjamin
and Rai 2007; Lemley 2001).  Among other things, the desire to avoid liability for willful
infringement,combinedwithadutyofcandorlimitedonlytopriorartofwhichtheapplicant
actuallyisaware,combinetoensurethatsomecompaniesperceiveastrongincentivenotto
discoverordisclosepriorartrelatedtotheirinvention(BurkandLemley2009:23;Lemleyand
Tangri2003).
The data presented here underscore the adverse effect this has on the prosecution
process.Themostobviouseffectsarethestrongrelationsbetweenvalidityontheonehand
and IDS filings (a positive relation) and examinerͲadded references on the other (a negative
relation).Theapplicantismuchbettersituatedtolocateandunderstandtherelevanceofprior
art related to the applicant’s invention.  This is true in part for the simple reason that the
applicant has much more time to spend on the invention; we doubt many applicants file
applicationswithoutspendingfarmorethanthetwentyhoursthatwouldbeagreatsuperfluity
oftimeonthepartoftheexaminer.Italsoistruebecausetheapplicantoritslawyershould
know a great deal more about the relevant technical field than the examiner studying the
application.
A robust search effort by the applicant also should improve the quality of the patent
applicationbecauseitshouldenhancethecrispnesswithwhichtheapplicantcanidentifythe
coreinventivenessthatjustifiesthepatent:onlybyremarkableluckcananapplicationwritten
without detailed knowledge of the prior art include claims that distinguish the claimed
invention from existing technology with precision.  Creating an incentive to use skilled legal
counsellikelytointegratethepriorartcapablyintotheapplicationisanimportantgoalhere.
To be sure, it is possible for the examiner to force redrafting of the application once the
examiner identifies the prior art, but editing of claims in response to specific challenges is a
poorsubstituteforinformeddraftingoftheentireapplicationinthefirstinstance.
Again, we are agnostic about the question of regulatory design, which is indeed a
difficult one.  In this particular case, the variety of legal rules that interact to undermine the
incentives of the applicant suggest that substantial statutory reform is required to ensure a
robustandaffirmativeobligationonthepartoftheapplicanttoprovideinformationaboutthe
priorart.25Wenoteoneprominentpossibilitydiscussedprominentlyintheexistingliterature,
toremovethestatutorypresumptionofvaliditywithrespecttoartnotcitedtotheexaminer
(LichtmanandLemley2007).Atbottom,however,itseemsclearthatapplicationsinwhichthe
applicantdoesnotundertaketoprovideareasonableassessmentofpriorartshouldbetreated

25

 One of the hardest problems is limiting the risks that inadvertent errors will render
thepatentinvalidinsubsequentlitigation,arealisticconcernundercurrentFederalCircuitrules
forinequitableconduct(Rai2009:2075Ͳ76).
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more cautiously than those in which the applicant does provide such an assessment.  At the
sametime,anysystemthatobligatesapplicantstoprovidepriorartmustdealwiththeobvious
problemsofdesigningsuchaproposaltoavoidlargeamountsofirrelevantinformation;aduty
to provide information could lead to irrelevant information either out of an abundance of
cautionor,lessbenignly,asaspeciesofpriorartfloodingdesignedtoconfusetheexaminer.26
RelianceonthepeerͲtoͲpatentprocess(www.peertopatent.org)alsocouldbeconstructiveasa
waytorespondtosystematicweaknessesinthePTO’scapabilitiestodiscoverpriorart,andit
mightbeparticularlyusefulfornonͲpatentpriorart.
But we think the most promising idea here would be more ambitious, establishing a
system of qualified search authorities.  Applications accompanied by search certificates from
qualifiedsearchauthoritiescouldreceivepreferentialtreatment,includinganexemptionfrom
liability for inequitable conduct.27  To be sure, there is the risk that the details of such a
proposalmightdisadvantagesmallerorlessliquidapplicants,especiallyiftheyeffectivelyshift
thecostsofexaminationtotheapplicant.Weemphasize,however,thatourprincipalgoalis
nottopressanyparticularreform.Rather,ourgoalistoemphasizethatthecombinationof
our data with the implications of theory and practice all suggest a major flaw in the existing
system.

5.2

RespectingtheResults

Another set of issues relates to finality of the examiner’s process.  One of the most
recognized problems with the present process is the limited practical ability of examiners to
finallyclosetheconsiderationofanapplication.Even“final”rejectionsarefinalonlyforthose
applicants that do not wish to press the matter further.  A coherent structure for the
prosecution process necessarily includes some mechanism for the examiners to terminate
further examination of the invention, leaving disgruntled applicants to their remedies before
theBoardandtheFederalCircuit.Thedataspeaktothisprobleminthreedistinctways.
First,thestronginverserelationbetweencontinuationsandvaliditybuttressthewidely
held perception that continuation practice affords inventors too many bites at the apple
(Lemley and Moore 2004).  This increases both the likelihood that frustrated examiners will
approve weak applications and that strategic applicants will be able to amend claims before
issuancetocoverinventionsthatothershavemadeindependentlyduringthependencyofthe

26

Forwhatitisworth,ourdatadonotsuggestthatsuchaproblemexistsatthepresent
time–thereisnogreaterlikelihoodofinvalidityforthepatentswithunusuallylargenumbers
of IDS submissions or dropped references.  But such a problem might emerge rapidly if
applicantsbecomeaffirmativelyobligatedtoproviderelevantinformation.Anyreforminthis
areashouldmonitordatacontinuouslytoidentifyanysuchadverseoutcomes.
27

Fordiscussionofasimilarproposal,seeStatementofJonW.Dudas,UnderSecretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate(June7,2007),availableathttp://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2007/2007jun06.jsp;
USPTO Contracts International Patent Application Searches to Commercial Firms (PTO Press
Release05Ͳ48,Sept.21,2005),availableathttp://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2005/05Ͳ48.jsp.
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application.ThePTOofcoursehasattemptedtoreininthispractice,butcourtstodatehave
beenunsympathetic.28Thedataaffordanempiricalbasisthatjustifiescontinuedpressureon
thispoint,eitherregulatoryorstatutory.
Second,itisimportanttoensurethatreviewbytheBoardimprovesthequalityofthe
patents that are issued, rather than the reverse.  Given the increased expertise and time for
deliberation by the Board, we expected that those patents would be much more likely to be
valid than patents that had not gone through Board review.  In the data, however, a better
explanation seems to be that the Board’s quasiͲjudicial decisionͲmaking process gives an
advantagetothelawͲfirmpresentationscharacteristicofsophisticatedapplicants,asopposed
to the presentations from those within the PTO.  It is perverse that the patents issued after
boardreviewaresomuchmorelikely(50percentagepointsmorelikelybyourestimation)to
be invalid than those issued without Board review.  Given the size of the dataset, and the
relative rarity of Board review, the number of patents in question is so small that other
explanationsmightexist.Still,thedatadosuggestthatfurtherinquiryintothereliabilityofthe
Board’sdeterminationsisappropriate.Amongotherthings,analysisofdecisionsappealedto
the Federal Circuit (where affirmance seems much more likely) might illuminate contrasts
betweenBoarddecisionsinfavorofandagainsttheapplicant.
Finally, from the opposite perspective – what happens when examiners approve
applications?–thedatasuggestanoddbutstrongrelationbetweenRule312amendmentsand
invalidity.Rule312permitsamendmentsafterapatentapplicationhasbeenapproved,with
thepurposeofcorrectingerrorsbeforethepatentactuallyisissued.29Inconcept,therelevant
amendmentsshouldbeminorandnonsubstantive.Yet,inthedataset,thepatentsissuedafter
those amendments are much less likely to be valid than those without those amendments.
Whatthissuggestsisthatthedefectsrepairedbythoseamendmentsarepaperingoverother
more serious problems with the patents.30  Accordingly, it might be appropriate to scrutinize
patentssubjecttothoseamendmentsmuchmorecarefullythancurrentlyisdone.Tobesure,
additional scrutiny might deter those motions.  But if that is true, it might result in those
patentsbeingissuedwithevenmoreglaringdefects.Ifso,thenperhapsthosepatentswould
belesscostlyinlitigationbecausetheycouldbedealtwithmoreexpeditiously.Inanyevent,
therelationapparentfromthedatasuggesttheneedforempiricalinquiryintothetypesand
consequencesofRule312amendmentsunderexistingpractice.

6.

Conclusion

28

 The continuation rules formerly codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(1) (2008) were held
invalid in Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and then withdrawn shortly after the
Obama Administration took office.  To be sure, many informed applicants offered persuasive
criticismsoftheparticularapproachtakenintherulesinvalidatedinDoll.Itremainstobeseen
whetherasecondeffortwilleitherexhibitmorenuanceorwithstandjudicialreview.
29

See37C.F.R.1.312.

30

ReviewoftheRule312amendmentstothepatentsinourdatasetsuggeststhatthey
quiteofteneffectsubstantialchangessuchasanalterationinthelanguageoftheclaims.
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Ourpaperstartsfromasimplepremise,absentfromtheburgeoningempiricalliterature
on patents, that the first place to start in improving the patent system is to understand how
valid patents differ from invalid patents.  The apparent flood of invalid patents could be
lessenedsubstantiallyiftheseedsofinvaliditycouldbeidentified–andremoved–duringthe
prosecution process.  To be sure, given the small number of patents that ever will end up in
litigation there is reason to doubt that the solution to the patent problem is to increase the
resourcesexpendedonpatentexaminationbyanorderofmagnitude.Butaslongaswehavea
prosecutionprocess,surelyitisimportanttoensurethattheresourceswedoexpendworkto
sortvalidfrominvalidpatentsasbestastheycan.
Weacknowledgethatourperspectiveignoresnumerousseriousproblemsinthepatent
system – not only substantive questions about patentablesubject matter, but also important
issuesaboutallocationofdecisionͲmakingauthority(betweencourtsandthePTO,betweenthe
Federal Circuit and district courts, and between judges and juries).  But if the root of the
problemistheweaknessoftheprosecutionprocess,empiricalattentiontothatprocessmust
bepartofanyseriouseffort.Werecognizethatoureffortreliesonasmallsetofthepatents
that have issued from that process, and that many of the possibilities we discuss could be
evaluatedmorethoroughlyinthelightofmorecompleteinformation.Butthatonlysuggests
themostimportantofallreforms,anopeningupofthePTO’srecordstoprovidereadyaccess
tomorecompleteinformationaboutalloftheapplicationsitexamines.
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TABLE1:STANDARDIZEDFACIALPATENTCHARACTERISTICS


ValidPatents InvalidPatents Difference
Claims
.63
.80
(.17)
IndependentClaims
.58
.83
(.25)
Words(Abstract)
.07
.16
(.09)
References
1.44
.87
.57*
U.S.References
.99
.68
.31
ForeignReferences
.59
.13
.46**
NPPA
1.87
1.60
.27
Classes
.14
Ͳ.05
.19
PriorityCountries
.76
1.43
(.67)***
U.S.PriorityPatents
.78
1.36
(.58)***
U.S.PatentsinFamily
1.20
3.81
(2.61)
ForeignPatentsinFamily
.73
.96
(.23)

Notes:TablereportsmeancharacteristicsforFederalCircuitpatentsintermsofstandarddeviationsfrom
themeanofasampleofnonͲlitigatedpatentsmatchedontimeofissuanceandtechnologyclass.
Differencesarecalculatedasmeanofvalid–meanofinvalid.N=363.
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1(basedontwoͲgroupttest)
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TABLE2:PROSECUTIONHISTORYVARIABLES

MeanClaimsinAppl.
MeanIndependentClaimsinAppl.
IDS(%)
IDSFilings(#)**
IDSReferences
Rejections(%)
RejectionsBasedonUnlistedReferences***
ExaminerͲAddedU.S.References*
DaysofProsecutionTime
(IssueDate–FirstActionDate)
PTODecisions(%)*
EUPriorityinFamily(%)
MeanContinuations/RCEs/CPAs***

ValidPatents
24
4.0
79
1.9
40
90
.54
4.0

InvalidPatents
26
4.6
74
1.4
28
85
.29
5.6

634

628

0.7
10.2
0.6

3.7
13.7
1.0

Notes:Tablereportsmeansorpercentages,asindicated,forFederalCircuitpatents,
fordatahandͲcollectedfromprosecutionhistories.N=360.
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1(basedontwoͲgrouptestsofmeanorproportion,asappropriate)
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TABLE3:LOGISTICREGRESSIONOFPATENTVALIDITY

VARIABLES

APPLICANT
INPUT
MODEL

PROSECUTIONMODEL

FINALMODEL

TECHNOLOGICALBREADTH
Standardizedclasses
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
.35(.12)[.06]***
SCOPEOFPROTECTION
Standardizedclaims
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
Ͳ.07(.07)[.04]
Independentclaims(application)
Ͳ.071(.044) [.01]
Ͳ.061(.038) [.01]
ͲͲ
PatentsinEU/JP
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
Ͳ.40(.19)[.06]**
APPLICANTSEARCH
#ofIDSfilings
.20(.07) [.02]***
.17(.069) [.03]**
.22(.08)[.03]***
IDSReferences
.004 (.002) [.001]*
.005(.002) [.00]**
ͲͲ
OFFICESEARCHEFFORT
ͲͲ
Ͳ.068(.031)[.01]**
Ͳ.10(.03) [.01]***
#ofExaminerͲAddedU.S.Refs
OFFICEACTIONS
#ofRejectionsbasedonunlistedreferences
ͲͲ
.37(.15)[.07]**
.37(.18) [.10]**
POSTͲEXAMINERACTIONS
Continuations
ͲͲ
Ͳ.24(.14) [.08]*
Ͳ.22(.15) [.09]*
Boarddecision(y/n)
ͲͲ
Ͳ2.0(1.2) [.22]*
Ͳ2.12(.99) [.23]**
Rule312amendment(y/n)
ͲͲ
Ͳ.67(.37)[.19]*
Ͳ.90(.38) [.21]**
TOTALRESEARCH
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
.12(.09) [.05]
StandardizedU.S.references
Standardizedforeignreferences
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
.17(.09) [.03]**
StandardizednonͲpatentpriorart
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
Ͳ.02(.02) [.02]
DRAFTINGQUALITY
Vector(SpecificationtoClaims)
ͲͲ
ͲͲ
Ͳ.04(.02) [.01]*
CONTROLS
ApplicationDate(Years)
Ͳ.14(.03) [.01]***
Ͳ.14(.03) [.01]***
Ͳ.15(.03) [.01]***
{TechnologyControlsOmitted.}
Constant
4.23 (.89) [.23]***
4.7(.97) [.25]***
6.90(1.38) [.41]***
Observations(Clusters)
359(254)
359(254)
356(252)
LogPseudolikelihood
Ͳ214
Ͳ201
Ͳ188
12%
17%
22%
GeneralizedR2
CorrectlyClassified
67%
70%
74%
Tabledisplayslogisticcoefficients,withrobuststandarderrorsinparentheses(clusteredondecisions)
andbootstrappedstandarderrorsinbrackets;***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1(basedonclusterederrors)
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